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ABSTRACT 
 
Regular unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are paid from reserves held in state accounts at 
the U.S. Treasury. The Great Recession exhausted the majority of UI reserve accounts, and not 
all states have rebuilt reserves. We examine the adequacy of current state and systemwide UI 
reserves to weather a mild, moderate, or severe recession in the coming months. Our results 
suggest that a recession as severe as the average of those occurring since 1975 would cause 18 
states to exhaust UI reserves. Our simulations account for the fact that several states have cut 
benefit generosity since the Great Recession ended. Results suggest that despite federal 
incentives for forward funding, reserves are insufficient in many states. By accepted standards, 
state benefit provisions are not excessive, but state-imposed constraints on financing make the 
system slow to recover from debt. We suggest modest actions for UI financing reform. 
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The federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system pays temporary partial earnings 
replacement to involuntarily unemployed applicants while they are actively seeking 
reemployment. The UI system is an automatic stabilizer for state economies, injecting spending 
from benefit payments quickly in economic downturns, and withdrawing spending during 
business recoveries because of fewer beneficiaries and higher tax contributions. There is now an 
increasing risk of recession in the near future. This raises questions about whether state UI 
systems are adequately prepared for another dramatic increase in benefit payments.1  
High unemployment in the Great Recession severely drained state UI reserve accounts, 
resulting in widespread borrowing. Thirty-six of 53 state UI programs took loans to pay regular 
UI benefits during the most recent crisis.2 Most states used the borrowing procedure available 
from the U.S. Treasury under Title XII of the Social Security Act, some issued state revenue 
bonds, others increased taxes, some allowed the federal unemployment tax obligation to rise, and 
10 states cut benefit generosity (Vroman 2018). Despite federal assistance that helped many 
indebted states during the Great Recession, as of December 2018, two states still had outstanding 
bond debts (Michigan and Pennsylvania), and one UI program (U.S. Virgin Islands) is still 
paying on loans from the U.S. Treasury.3  
In this paper, we briefly review the aggregate history of UI benefit financing, assess the 
current levels of state reserves, then simulate the financial impacts on individual state UI reserve 
positions of a mild, moderate, and severe recession in the near term. Our simulations account for 
 
1 O’Leary and Kline (2016) estimate that as of December 31, 2015, a majority of states were in jeopardy of 
exhausting UI reserves if a moderate recession occurred soon. This paper relies on our earlier work but improves on 
the previous methodology by explicitly accounting for changes in state benefit provisions.  
2 In addition to the 50 states, UI operates in Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
3 Temporary waivers to states on loan interest from UI debts accumulated during the recession are 
explained in Chocolaad, Vroman, and Hobbie (2013).  
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the changes in 10 states that reduced UI benefit generosity. Results of the simulations provide 
notice to states likely to face shortfalls in UI benefit reserves during the next economic crisis. 
STANDARDS FOR UI RESERVE ADEQUACY 
Forward funding of UI benefits contributes to the system being countercyclical rather 
than procyclical. Having money in reserve when unemployment rises means states do not have to 
immediately raise employer UI taxes to pay benefits during recessions. Accumulating reserves 
during economic recoveries slightly dampens expansions and helps avoid severe financial crises 
in the depths of recessions. To achieve adequate forward funding, state accounts in the federal 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should maintain balances “sufficient to pay at least one year 
of UI benefits at levels comparable to its ‘high cost’” (Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation 1996, p. 11) over the previous 20 years.4 In 2010, a federal incentive for states to 
meet this forward funding standard was introduced. The final regulation on this matter was 
published by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) in the Federal Register on September 17, 
2010, as 20 CFR, Part 606. To satisfy the rule, states should hold one year of average recent 
recession-level benefits in the UTF by year end 2019 and thereafter. States meeting this standard 
qualify for interest-free, short-term Title XII loans should borrowing be needed to pay benefits. 
At the start of 2019, UI reserves in 24 states reserves were still not sufficient to meet the 
prescribed standard (USDOL 2019a).  
USDOL defines the UTF reserve ratio as deposits in state UI reserve accounts at the U.S. 
Treasury divided by total wages paid in UI-covered employment. The aggregate reserve ratio 
 
4 The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation was the most recent federal advisory council 
convened by Congress on the topic of UI. The bipartisan council published final recommendations in 1996.  
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combining net balances for all 53 programs is represented by the solid curve in Figure 1. This net 
measure accounts for any Title XII borrowing by states, but Figure 1 does not account for debt 
financed either by state revenue bonds or other borrowing. The UI system reserve ratio was 
around 2 percent of total wages before both the 1991 and the 2001 recessions. During each of 
those recessions, more than a dozen states were forced to borrow, but the combined system 
stayed positive.  
 
Figure 1  Reserve Ratios for the UI System—Combined Net Reserves of All 53 States and Territories as a 
Percent of Total and Taxable Wages, 1938–2018 
 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b). 
 
Taxable wage bases, which determine the size of taxable payrolls, vary widely across 
states and are an indicator of state attitudes toward forward funding UI benefits. The 2019 UI 
taxable wage base is $52,700 in Washington State but only $7,000 in Arizona, California, 
Florida, Puerto Rico, and Tennessee. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxable wage 
base has been fixed at $7,000 per worker since 1983, and state taxable wage bases must be at 
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least as high as the FUTA taxable wage base. Many states have not raised their taxable wage 
bases very much above the minimum required level. More than half of all states (29) have 
taxable wage bases at or below $15,000.5  
The FUTA taxable wage base has been increased only three times since it was set at 
$3,000 in 1939. It was raised in 1972, 1978, and finally in 1983 to $7,000. UI was established 
under the Social Security Act of 1935, and the UI and Social Security taxable wage bases were 
the same until 1950. The Social Security taxable wage base was raised for the sixth time in 1972 
then starting in 1975 it was tied to the National Average Wage Index and has increased almost 
every year since. Despite some states having UI taxable wage bases much higher than others 
only about 26 percent of all UI-covered earnings are now subject to UI taxes.6 Whereas about 85 
percent of all covered earnings are taxable under Social Security (Whitman and Shoffner 2011).  
Raising state taxable wage bases would be an effective means of improving forward 
funding of UI benefits. Vroman and Woodbury (2014) also say that tax bases should be indexed 
to wage increases. Because as earnings increase over time, to maintain adequate UI wage 
replacement rates, benefits should increase too. Furthermore, Vroman (2011) finds a high 
correlation between indexing the tax base and trust fund solvency. And as Vroman and 
Woodbury (2014, p. 261) say, “Only 6 of the 16 state UI programs that were indexed had to 
borrow from the federal government during the Great Recession, while 29 of the 35 that were not 
indexed needed to borrow.”  
 
5 The national average weekly wage in UI-covered employment was $1,097 in the first quarter of 2019. 
Therefore, $15,000 is barely higher than average covered full-time earnings in one calendar quarter.  
6 UI taxable earnings of $1.7 trillion were 25.7 percent of $6.6 trillion in UI-covered earnings in 2018 
(USDOL 2019b).  
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STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE BETWEEN BENEFITS AND TAXES 
UI financing operates with a lag to avoid procyclical effects, but tax revenues should 
balance with benefit payments over time. In recent years there has been an imbalance (Figure 2). 
As a percentage of taxable earnings, over the 50-year period from 1969 to 2018, benefits 
averaged 2.56 percent while tax payments averaged 2.39 percent—a structural deficiency of 0.2 
percentage points or a 7.2 percent average annual shortfall in tax revenues.7 After high 
unemployment in 1980 and 1982, UI reserves recovered by 1989 to peak at 2 percent of total 
wages and 5 percent of taxable wages before the 1991 recession. Before the 2001 recession, UI 
system reserves recovered to about 1.5 percent of total wages and 4.8 percent of taxable wages. 
In the weak recovery that followed, UI reserves reached only 0.8 percent of total wages and 2.9 
 
Figure 2  UI Benefits and Taxes as Percentages of Taxable Wages, 1969–2018 
  
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b). 
 
7 The ratio of benefits paid to total wages is called the benefit-cost rate. Ratios are based on actual data for 
UI benefits paid and tax contributions.  
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percent of taxable wages before the Great Recession. These levels proved to be insufficient as 
combined reserves of the system were negative from 2009 to 2011. 
If the United States is to be adequately prepared to weather a future severe recession, 
these historical data suggest that pre-recession reserves should be close to 2.0 percent of total 
wages or 5.0 percent of taxable wages. By the end of 2018, after several years of economic 
growth and labor market improvement, reserves have recovered to only 1.0 percent of total 
wages and 3.91 percent of taxable wages. 
STATE RESPONSES TO THE GREAT RECESSION UI FUNDING CRISIS 
Federal UI conformity rules require states to experience rate employer UI taxes, meaning 
that employer UI tax rates rise after benefit charges against their accounts increase. Tax changes 
in most states operate with three- or four-year lags so as not to be procyclical. Following the 
Great Recession many states allowed their tax systems to automatically raise rates, some states 
took legislative action to raise rates, other states with inadequate state tax systems or without 
political will to raise taxes allowed the FUTA offset to decline with the difference applied to 
reduce Title XII debt to the Treasury. Some of these states took legislative action to override 
automatic increases in employer tax rates, and some sold revenue bonds adding new statutory 
taxes (Vroman 2018).  
The statutory mechanism for financing state UI benefit payment debt is to borrow from 
the U.S. Treasury under Title XII of the Social Security Act. However, financing of UI debt with 
state revenue bonds has become increasingly popular among states. Eight states sold bonds in 
recent years to finance UI debt (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas). For example, in late 2011, Michigan repaid its $3.2 billion UI debt to 
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the U.S. Treasury by raising money through a bond sale. At the time, Title XII loans were 
charging 2.94 percent, whereas the Michigan bonds were sold at an effective rate of 0.24 percent. 
This strategy was expected save Michigan close to $150 million over the term of the debt. 
Michigan’s remaining debt in private markets (including principal and interest) totaled $821.3 
million as of fiscal year ending date September 30, 2018, with the final repayment of those bonds 
not expected until 2021. Pennsylvania’s outstanding debt including future interest payments was 
nearly $1.1 billion as of June 30, 2018, with final repayment expected in 2022 (Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania 2018). The bonding process is a good financial strategy when municipal bond 
rates are lower than interest charges by the U.S. Treasury for UI borrowing, but revenue bonds 
add taxes that are general obligations outside the usual employer-financed UI system and can 
delay repayment, thereby weakening the countercyclical feature of UI forward funding.  
REDUCTIONS IN BENEFIT GENEROSITY  
In the years following the Great Recession, many states made program changes to 
improve their UI reserve positions. Since it is particularly important in simulating the UI 
financing consequences of future recessions, we closely examine the 10 states that cut UI benefit 
generosity since 2010 (Table 1). The 2008 Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) 
program that provided federally funded extensions of benefit durations prohibited cuts in weekly 
benefit amounts for states wanting federally paid EUC available for exhaustees of regular UI. 
However, EUC did not address the potential duration of benefits. Nine states limited benefit 
reductions to shortening potential durations only. However, North Carolina both shortened 
potential duration and reduced the maximum weekly benefit amount from a formula-based $504 
to a fixed $350, which will remain in effect until further legislative action. This reduction in 
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maximum benefits, effective July 1, 2013, ended federal EUC payments to more than 70,000 
North Carolina UI beneficiaries and prevented others from receiving federally paid EUC through 
the end of 2013.  
 
Table 1  Reserve Positions on December 31, 2018, of States that Reduced Maximum Duration of UI Benefits 
to Fewer than 26 Weeks Since 2011 
 
State 
Net reserve position ($000s) Avg recession 
peak-to-trough 
changea 
Net reserves 
2010 
Net reserves 
2018 
Taxable wages 
2018 
Reserve ratio 
2018 
      
Arkansas −279,053 742,675 11,342,908 6.55 −2.80 
Florida −1,854,444 3,872,081 65,752,041 5.89 −2.48 
Georgia −512,613 2,199,750 42,761,848 5.14 −2.89 
Idaho −96,997 654,766 16,068,015 4.07 −1.77 
Illinoisb −2,374,242 1,923,563 68,406,823 2.81 −5.96 
Kansas −44,715 825,504 22,574,773 3.66 −1.66 
Michiganc −3,522,379 4,210,290 37,541,863 11.21 −8.40 
Missouri −703,580 942,973 29,854,246 3.16 −3.28 
North Carolina −2,282,946 3,592,731 76,611,951 4.69 −2.88 
South Carolina −879,672 919,712 25,389,375 3.62 −4.19 
      
Total above states −12,550,641 19,884,045 396,303,843 5.02 −3.63 
All other states −18,162,982 46,607,120 1,305,318,802 3.57 −3.06 
All states −30,713,623 66,491,165 1,701,622,645 3.91 −3.17 
a Recessions include 2008–09, 2001–02, 1991–92, 1980–83 and 1974–75. For these five recessions, the peaks in business 
activity prior to the recession are designated as 2007, 2000, 1990, 1979 and 1973. After these peak years, for each state, we 
searched for the minimum net reserve balance and used that value to define the funding trough. For each of the five recessions, 
the change in the reserve ratio is calculated by taking the change in the net reserve balance from peak-to-trough and dividing by 
peak-year taxable wages. These five values are then averaged. 
b Illinois shortened potential duration to a uniform 25 weeks in 2012 but restored the maximum to 26 the following year. 
Illinois shortened duration to a uniform 24 weeks for 2019. 
c Net reserves for 2018 do not reflect the outstanding Michigan bond debt of $821.3 million on December 31, 2018. 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations.  
 
 
Effective in January 2012, Michigan permanently cut the maximum duration of regular 
UI benefits from 26 to 20 weeks. Arkansas, Missouri, and South Carolina also cut potential UI 
duration to a maximum of 20 weeks. Illinois shortened potential duration to 25 weeks for the 
year 2012 only and returned the maximum to 26 weeks in 2013, but has since reduced the 
maximum to 24 weeks. New laws in Florida, Georgia, Kansas, and North Carolina established 
rules to vary the maximum potential duration of UI benefits directly with the level of 
unemployment. Effective July 1, 2012, Georgia cut the maximum duration of benefits from 26 
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weeks to a range of 14 and 20 weeks, with potential duration longer for a higher unemployment 
rate.  
Florida adopted a similar variable maximum approach, with the potential duration falling 
to as few as 12 weeks if the unemployment rate is at or below 5 percent. Each 0.5 percentage-
point increase above 5 percent adds one week to the maximum potential UI benefit duration in 
Florida, which peaks at 23 weeks for unemployment rates at or above 10.5 percent. In 2013, 
North Carolina set the maximum duration range to be 12 to 20 weeks, and in 2016, Kansas 
adopted a variable potential duration ranging from 16 to 26 weeks.  
States may have cut durations to reduce future obligations to pay benefits, and states 
might have been emboldened because of an expectation that federal extensions of benefits would 
be forthcoming in high unemployment periods (O’Leary 2013). The federally funded extensions 
of UI in the Great Recession yielded potential durations of at least 39 weeks at times in all states 
and up to 99 weeks in some states. Cuts in the maximum potential duration of regular state UI 
benefits could also have been motivated by concerns that excessive durations in the recession 
reduced incentives for return to work. However, there is research evidence that work 
disincentives from longer benefit durations are weak in recession periods (Schmieder, von 
Wachter, and Bender 2012). Furthermore, evidence from several studies of reducing potential UI 
duration suggest only a small increase in reemployment rates from shortening potential durations 
of unemployment benefits. Among eight studies reviewed, the mean estimated nonemployment 
increase to longer duration is about 10 percent (Filges, Jonassen, and Jørgensen 2018).  
Table 1 summarizes the year-end 2018 net reserve balances of the 10 states that lowered 
their maximum potential durations of UI from 26 weeks.8 Florida reserves were $1.9 billion in 
 
8 This table does not account for state sales of revenue bonds to finance UI debt; only Title XII loans are 
figured into the balances listed.  
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debt before recovering to a $3.9 billion surplus by the end of 2018. Georgia’s net reserves were 
$513 million in debt in 2010 but recovered to a $2.2 billion surplus by the end of 2018. Michigan 
reserves were $3.5 billion in debt in 2010 and have recovered substantially, to a positive $4.2 
billion on deposit at the U.S. Treasury, with bond debt of $821 million remaining so that reserves 
actually were $3.4 billion at the end of 2018. Despite the 2018 year-end reserve positions listed 
in Table 1, our simulations suggest that 2 of the 10 states (Illinois and South Carolina) still do 
not have reserve positions sufficient to survive an “average” recession without borrowing.  
In terms of recovering from the Great Recession, the benefit-cutting states have returned 
to better reserve positions with a weighted average reserve ratio just over 5.02, while the 
remaining states averaged reserves of 3.57 percent of taxable wages at year end 2018. Our 
financing simulations reported below suggest that shortening potential UI durations generally 
improves state reserve positions, but the cuts do not entirely eliminate the likelihood of 
borrowing in future recessions. Nonetheless, shortening potential durations certainly reduces the 
adequacy of income replacement to unemployed workers and their households, thereby reducing 
the countercyclical strength of spending spurred by UI. 
There are no federal conformity standards for weekly benefit amounts or potential 
duration of UI. However, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996, p. 22) 
enunciated accepted benefit standards, stipulating that “each state should replace at least 50 
percent of lost earnings over a six-month period [26 weeks], with a maximum weekly benefit 
amount equal to two-thirds of the state’s average weekly wages.” It is important to note that 
states cutting benefits may have even weaker countercyclical systems because the duration of 
EUC type benefits have historically been provided in proportion to the potential duration of 
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regular state UI benefits.9 The North Carolina cuts in potential duration and maximum weekly 
benefit amount are estimated to have reduced the countercyclical strength of the state system by 
two-thirds (O’Leary 2013). 
SIMULATING IMPACTS OF RECESSIONS ON UI RESERVES  
Simulations of state UI reserve balances in mild, moderate, and severe recessions are 
based on histories from recessions in 2008–2009, 2001–2002, 1991–1992, 1980–1983, and 
1974–1975. For these five recessions, the preceding peaks in business activity were designated 
as 2007, 2000, 1990, 1979, and 1973, respectively. After the peaks, we search for the minimum 
net reserve balance for each state and use that to define the trough reserve level following a 
recession. The length of time from peak to trough differs across states and reflects experience-
rating features in state UI tax law, as well as variation in the timing and impacts of declining 
economic conditions. For each of the five recessions, the change in reserve ratio is calculated as 
the difference in net reserve balance from peak to trough divided by peak-year taxable wages. 
The dip in reserve ratio for an “average” recession is computed as the peak-to-trough drop in 
reserve ratio averaged over all five historical periods. For simulations, we define the dip for a 
“mild” recession as the average drop during the 2001–2002 and 1991–1992 recessions, and the 
dip for a “severe” recession as the average over the 2008–2009, 1980–1983, and 1974–1975 
recessions. Our simulations of a near term future recession start with the official net reserve 
 
9 Many states vary potential UI duration across individual beneficiaries based on their prior recent earnings. 
EUC for individuals with potential durations less than the state maximum is available in proportion to their actual 
completed duration at the time of exhausting regular benefits.  
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balances for each state at the end of 2018, after deducting any outstanding bond debt. The 
simulations examine reserves as a fraction of taxable wages.  
Simulating Regular UI Benefits under Shorter Potential Durations 
 Five states adopted shorter fixed potential durations, while five chose to have variable 
potential durations. Our simulations were calibrated using micro data for one state from each of 
the two groups. For the group that reduced to a fixed potential duration, we used Michigan UI 
administrative data, and for the states that switched to a variable potential duration we used 
Georgia data. The Michigan data begin in January 2001, while the Georgia data begin in January 
1996. Both series end in December 2010.10 
Fixed potential duration states 
 Available Michigan data span the relatively mild 2001–2003 recession and the severe 
2007–2009 recession. To include some data from recovery periods the mild simulation used 
Michigan data from 2001 to 2006, with the year 2000 assumed to be the year preceding peak 
expansion in Michigan and in all states simulated. The business cycle trough year is set for each 
state depending on the state’s UI reserve balance. By this measure, in Michigan the trough in 
reserves did not occur until 2006. For Michigan, the computations for the severe recession are 
based on data from 2007 (the assumed peak business cycle year for all states) through 2010 (the 
last available data). 
 To simulate the effects of the shorter potential UI duration in either mild or severe 
recessions we first sum the actual regular UI compensation received across all regular UI 
 
10 Full benefit year data are incomplete for UI applicants in the last few months of 2010. Therefore, the 
Georgia analysis uses regular UI beneficiaries whose benefit year begin date is in September 2010 or earlier. For 
Michigan, the benefit year must have begun in August 2010 or earlier, as defined by the benefit year begin date. 
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beneficiaries. Next, assuming no behavioral response to the shorter potential duration, we 
calculate an alternate estimate for each beneficiary’s UI compensation that is limited by the 
reduced potential duration value (16, 20, or 24, depending on the state) multiplied by the 
Table 2  Summary of the Methodology for Estimating the Percentage Reduction in Regular UI Benefit Costs 
during Recession  
 
State 
Recession type 
Mild Average Severe 
     
Initial estimates (% change)     
   20 weeks (MI, MO, SC) −11.7 −13.6 −14.9 
   16 weeks (AR) −23.2 −26.0 −27.8 
   24 Weeks (IL) −3.2 −3.9 −4.4 
       
 Peak-to-trough actual duration (weeks) 
Arkansas 13.2 13.3 13.4 
Illinois 17.9 18.1 18.2 
Michigan 14.3 15.3 16.0 
Missouri 15.0 14.7 14.4 
South Carolina 12.8 12.7 12.7 
    
 Peak-to-trough potential duration (weeks) 
Arkansas 23.2 22.9 22.8 
Illinois 26.0 25.8 25.7 
Michigan 23.5 23.6 23.7 
Missouri 22.6 22.4 22.3 
South Carolina 23.0 23.2 23.3 
    
 Ratio of actual-to-potential 
Arkansas 0.570 0.580 0.587 
Illinois 0.688 0.699 0.706 
Michigan 0.608 0.649 0.676 
Missouri 0.664 0.654 0.647 
South Carolina 0.555 0.549 0.546 
    
 Ratio of actual-to-potential relative to Michigan 
Arkansas 0.937 0.894 0.868 
Illinois 1.132 1.076 1.044 
Michigan 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Missouri 1.092 1.007 0.957 
South Carolina 0.912 0.846 0.807 
    
Final estimates (% change)    
   Arkansas −21.7 −23.2 −24.1 
   Illinois −3.6 −4.2 −4.6 
   Michigan −11.7 −13.6 −14.9 
   Missouri −12.8 −13.7 −14.3 
   South Carolina  −10.7 −11.5 −12.0 
NOTE: Based on Michigan micro data for states that lowered their maximum potential regular UI duration to a fixed number of 
weeks less than 26 after the Great Recession. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b) and Michigan micro administrative UI data. 
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beneficiary’s weekly benefit amount (WBA). If the beneficiary’s actual regular UI compensation 
is less than the reduced potential duration multiplied by the WBA, that amount is used. 
Otherwise, the value limited by 16, 20, or 24 times the WBA is used. These revised amounts are 
then summed across all regular UI beneficiaries and the percentage difference from the actual 
amount paid is calculated. 
 The first row of Table 2 shows the results of computations for 20 weeks potential 
duration using the Michigan administrative UI data. This computation suggests in the case of 
maximum potential duration changing from 26 to 20 weeks that Michigan UI beneficiaries 
would receive 11.7 percent less in UI compensation during a mild recessions and 14.9 percent 
less in a severe recession. Overall the simulated mean reduction in UI compensation paid during 
recession years was 13.6 percent for Michigan.11 UI compensation reductions are considerably 
larger for the Arkansas case of 16 weeks maximum potential UI duration with declines of −23.2 
and −27.8 during the mild and severe recessions, respectively (−26.0 percent on average). Given 
the more modest change to 24 weeks potential duration in Illinois, UI benefits paid decline −3.2 
percent in a mild recession and –4.4 percent in a severe downturn (−3.9 percent on average). 
 The next step is to transfer these percentage change estimates based on the Michigan data 
to Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, and South Carolina. We used state-specific information to 
compute the recession share of potential regular UI benefits used in each state. Data from the UI 
Financial Data Handbook (ETA 394, USDOL 2019) were used to calculate the average peak-to-
trough values for actual and potential regular UI duration (Table 2). Next, the resulting actual-to-
potential ratios for Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri and South Carolina relative to the ratio for 
 
11 Since the mild estimate will be used in simulations for two recessions (2001–2003 and 1991–1992) and 
the severe estimate for three recessions (2008–2009, 1980–1983 and 1974–1975), the mean is not the middle of the 
two values since the weights two-fifths mild and three-fifths severe. 
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Michigan were multiplied by the percentage reduction estimates to approximate the benefit 
payment impacts for each state. 
Variable potential duration states 
 Simulations for the reduction in regular UI benefit payments for the variable duration 
states of Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, and North Carolina are similar to the procedure for 
fixed duration states. The main refinement involves accounting for the state-specific rules for 
using state unemployment rates to set the potential duration of UI benefits. 
 Simulations used monthly unemployment data from USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics program and applied state UI statutory rules for the 
available Georgia data period from January 1996 to December 2010. The resulting potential UI 
durations for each of the four states over time were then applied to the Georgia micro data to 
produce UI benefit payment reduction estimates for each state in mild and severe recessions. 
Examples of translating unemployment rates into UI potential durations are given in Figure 3 for 
Florida and Figure 4 for Kansas.  
Each graph shows how the potential UI duration values would have changed historically 
with respect to the two unemployment rate measures, had the variable potential UI duration laws 
been in effect before. The figures contrast the simulated potential UI durations based on the 
actual and the policy effective unemployment rates for 1976 through 2017. The graphs highlight 
some important facts about how the state laws translate unemployment rates into potential UI 
durations. First, there is a two-month lag in published Local Area Unemployment Statistics state 
rates. Second, because of the statutory rules for translating unemployment measures into 
potential UI durations, economic conditions may deteriorate or improve substantially before 
potential benefit duration changes are made. 
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Figure 3  Florida’s Maximum Potential Duration of Regular UI based on the Current and Prior Year’s 
Third-Quarter Monthly Average Unemployment Rate 
 
SOURCE: Florida statute 443.111 and USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate seasonally adjusted for Florida 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
 
 For example, the Florida rule summarized in Figure 3 uses the average monthly 
unemployment rate in the third quarter of the prior calendar year to determine potential UI 
duration for the full following calendar year beginning January 1.12 In Florida the shortest 
potential UI duration is 12 weeks when the unemployment rate is at or below 5 percent. The 
potential duration increases by one week for each 0.5 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate. The potential duration reaches 23 weeks when the unemployment rate is 
10.5 percent or higher. Under the Florida law, benefit durations do not adjust quickly enough to 
 
12 For Florida, see FL Stat § 443.111. http://www.leg.state.fl.us; for Georgia, see HB 347. 
www.legis.ga.gov; for Idaho, see HB 485, 2016 second regular session. 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2016/legislation/; for Kansas, see KS § 44-704 (2017). 
http://www.kslegislature.org; For North Carolina, see NC Stat § 96-14.2. www.ncleg.net. 
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changes in the degree of hardship faced by unemployed workers. For example, the three-month 
average unemployment rate for the third quarter of 2008 was 6.7 percent, so that rate would set 
the potential duration of regular UI for 2009 at 15 weeks. However, the labor market deteriorated 
rapidly thereafter, and Florida unemployment reached 11.2 percent in December 2009. The 
Florida UI statute would have set the 2010 potential UI duration at 23 weeks starting January 
2010. The difference in potential duration for someone applying for UI in December 2009 and 
January 2010 would be 8 weeks or up to $2,200 at the Florida maximum UI weekly benefit 
amount of $275. This could induce strategic behavior to delay UI application, thereby slowing 
income transfers and the automatic stimulus to dampen a recession. Conversely, under improving 
economic conditions, it would be strategic to quickly apply for benefits, thus perhaps even 
inducing employer collusion to time layoffs. 
 The other four states with variable potential durations have laws that result in shorter lags 
after unemployment rate changes. Both Georgia and North Carolina have laws that can reset 
their potential UI durations twice each year––in January and July.13 The seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate in October determines the potential UI duration for the following January 
through June, and the April rate determines the potential UI duration for July through December. 
The statutes in Idaho and Kansas respond most quickly to unemployment rate changes. In Idaho, 
potential duration is reevaluated for each quarter. The Idaho unemployment rate from the prior 
November determines potential duration for the first quarter of the year and the rates from 
February, May, and August set maximum duration for the second, third, and fourth quarters, 
respectively.14 Kansas (Figure 4) uses the most recently available three-month average of 
 
13 Graphs showing these systems are given in Appendix A as Figures A3 and A4 for Georgia and A9 and 
A10 for North Carolina.  
14 Graphs applying the Idaho rules for setting potential UI duration are given in Appendix Figures A5 and 
A6. 
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seasonally adjusted unemployment rates. Graphically, the rapid Kansas adjustments can be seen 
in the small horizontal distance between curves representing a potential UI duration set based on 
the current month unemployment rate and one set using the average of the three preceding 
months. 
 
Figure 4  Kansas’s Maximum Potential Duration of Regular UI based on the Current and Three-Month 
Moving Average Unemployment Rate 
SOURCE: Kansas statute 44-704 (2017) and USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate seasonally adjusted for Kansas 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
 
 
Using the legal statutes and unemployment rate histories for each state, we calculated the 
potential UI durations and inserted those values into the Georgia micro data during the mild and 
severe recession periods observed. The resulting initial estimates of the percentage reductions in 
regular UI benefit outlays are reported in the first section of Table 3. Each of these estimates are 
computed on the micro data by the same method used for the fixed duration states––with 
payments to each beneficiary figured at or below the new simulated threshold. Each state’s initial 
percentage benefit reduction estimate was then multiplied by its peak-to-trough ratio of actual-to-  
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
M
ax
im
u
m
 p
o
te
n
ti
al
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
w
ee
k
s)
Current unemployment rate
Three-month moving average unemployment rate
 19 
Table 3  Methodology for Estimating the Percentage Reductions in Regular UI Benefits in Recessions  
 
State 
Recession type 
Mild Average Severe 
    
Initial estimates (% change)    
 Florida −32.4 −26.8 −23.0 
 Georgia −26.2 −21.6 −18.6 
 Idaho −3.6 −2.6 −2.0 
 Kansas −12.8 −9.1 −6.7 
 North Carolina −28.0 −24.5 −22.1 
    
 Peak-to-trough actual duration (weeks) 
Florida 15.2 14.7 14.5 
Georgia 11.6 11.6 11.5 
Idaho 12.7 12.9 13.0 
Kansas 14.5 14.4 14.4 
North Carolina 11.2 11.8 12.1 
      
 Peak-to-trough potential duration (weeks) 
Florida 20.9 20.6 20.3 
Georgia 21.2 20.3 19.8 
Idaho 20.4 20.2 20.0 
Kansas 23.2 23.0 22.8 
North Carolina 23.3 23.3 23.3 
    
 Ratio of actual-to-potential 
Florida 0.726 0.717 0.711 
Georgia 0.550 0.570 0.583 
Idaho 0.622 0.637 0.647 
Kansas 0.626 0.628 0.630 
North Carolina  0.480 0.505 0.522 
    
 Ratio of actual-to-potential relative to Georgia 
Florida 1.319 1.259 1.219 
Georgia 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Idaho 1.130 1.118 1.109 
Kansas 1.137 1.103 1.080 
North Carolina 0.873 0.887 0.895 
    
Final estimates (% change) Relative ratio times initial estimates 
 Florida −42.7 −33.7 −28.0 
 Georgia −26.2 −21.6 −18.6 
 Idaho −4.1 −3.0 −2.2 
 Kansas −14.6 −10.1 −7.2 
 North Carolina −24.4 −21.7 −19.8 
NOTE: Based on Georgia micro data for states adopting a variable maximum potential duration less than 26 weeks based on the 
state unemployment rate. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b), Georgia micro administrative UI data, and USDOL, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la unemployment rate seasonally 
adjusted. 
 
 
potential duration relative to the same ratio for Georgia. The final estimates for percentage 
benefit reductions in each state for mild or severe recessions were then applied to annual, UI 
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Financial Handbook (ETA 394) data on UI benefit and employer tax payments in each of the 
recessions in each state’s relevant peak-to-trough interval.  
Reductions in regular UI outlays due to shorter maximum entitlements mean that 
employer reserve positions would not deteriorate as much as actually occurred during the 
recessions when state statutes provided a 26-week potential duration. In turn, employer tax rates 
would not increase as much because of relatively smaller regular UI benefit charges. 
Unfortunately, our micro data are limited to UI applicants and UI benefit recipients, so we 
cannot simulate the impact of reduced benefit charges on employer tax rates. Given this 
limitation, we assume that employer tax payments decline by the same percentage as the 
reduction in regular UI benefit payments.15  
The top row in the bottom panel of Table 4 shows the simulated improvement in UI 
reserves totaled across the 10 states due to their reduced UI benefit durations. Table 5 presents 
decompositions of the simulated changes in reserves by listing the simulated changes in 
recession period benefit payments and tax revenues. Since experience rating changes UI tax rates 
in direct relation to benefit payments, state UI tax revenues usually increase along with tax rates. 
As a first approximation, our simulations apply the same recession factors to benefits and taxes. 
Simulation results in Table 5 suggest that total recession benefits paid in the 10 benefit reduction 
states would fall by between $6.1 and $6.5 billion, with total tax revenues falling by between 
$3.5 and $3.7 billion during recessions. Certainly, UI tax-paying businesses will retain more  
 
 
15 Summaries of changes in employer tax revenues and UI benefit payments from the accounting point-of-
view for each state are found in Appendix Tables A1–A10. The tables summarize the changes for each of the five 
recessions used in the simulations. The first row for each recession is the expansion peak value for tax revenue and 
benefit costs that occurred just prior to the downturn. The peak years for each recession are assumed to be the same 
for each state in the simulations. The recession trough years will vary across states. The percentage changes are 
applied to each year after the peak through the trough. The year-to-year net change in each state’s reserve balance is 
summed and that total added to their trough reserve balance that is used in the simulations. For most states and their 
recession experience, the values in Tables A1–A10 suggest net additions to trough reserve positions.  
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Table 4  Simulated Post-Recession UI Reserve Balances of States that Reduced Maximum Potential Durations 
of Regular UI Benefits after the Great Recession ($000s) 
  
   
Mild 
recession 
Average 
recession 
Severe 
recession 
    
 Unadjusted for entitlement changes ($1,000) 
Total value at trough 9,359,999 3,738,933 -8,445 
    
Arkansas 559,948 424,868 334,815 
Florida 2,880,108 2,242,217 1,816,956 
Georgia 1,281,930 964,763 753,318 
Idaho 455,164 369,956 313,150 
Illinois −463,182 −2,154,326 −3,281,755 
Kansas 559,614 451,281 379,059 
Michigan 1,623,501 236,362 −688,397 
Missouri −29,048 −36,701 −41,803 
North Carolina 2,208,093 1,383,857 834,366 
South Carolina 283,870 −143,344 −428,153 
    
 Adjusted for entitlement changes ($1,000) 
Total value at trough 11,926,105 6,434,591 2,773,582 
    
Arkansas 616,639 505,764 431,848 
Florida 3,644,756 2,897,204 2,398,836 
Georgia 1,645,354 1,311,465 1,088,872 
Idaho 469,429 380,828 321,761 
Illinois −358,707 −1,979,937 −3,060,756 
Kansas 666,387 514,507 413,254 
Michigan 1,854,814 639,966 −169,933 
Missouri 117,487 101,783 91,313 
North Carolina 2,897,358 2,067,077 1,513,557 
South Carolina 372,588 −4,066 −255,169 
    
 Difference in reserve position ($1,000) 
Total value at trough 2,566,107 2,695,659 2,782,027 
    
Arkansas 56,691 80,896 97,033 
Florida 764,648 654,988 581,881 
Georgia 363,424 346,702 335,554 
Idaho 14,266 10,873 8,611 
Illinois 104,475 174,389 220,999 
Kansas 106,773 63,226 34,195 
Michigan 231,313 403,603 518,464 
Missouri 146,535 138,484 133,116 
North Carolina 689,265 683,220 679,191 
South Carolina 88,718 139,277 172,984 
NOTE: Assuming 2018 are peak reserve levels with and without adjustment for reduced potential duration.  
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b) and Georgia and Michigan micro administrative data. 
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Table 5  Simulated Recession Effects on UI Benefit Payments and UI Tax Revenues of States that Reduced 
Potential Durations of Regular UI Benefits after the Great Recession ($000s) 
 Benefit 
payments 
reduction 
 
Tax revenues 
reduction 
 
Net reserves 
increase 
    
Mild recession 6,086,424 3,520,317 2,566,107 
    
Arkansas 187,359 130,668 56,691 
Florida 1,577,290 812,642 764,648 
Georgia 588,666 225,243 363,423 
Idaho 39,649 25,383 14,266 
Illinois 248,916 144,442 104,475 
Kansas 350,373 243,601 106,773 
Michigan 727,193 495,880 231,313 
Missouri 382,778 236,242 146,535 
North Carolina 1,783,810 1,094,545 689,266 
South Carolina 200,389 111,671 88,718 
    
Average recession 6,344,014 3,648,353 2,695,661 
    
Arkansas 247,305 166,410 80,895 
Florida 1,331,906 676,918 654,988 
Georgia 707,313 360,611 346,702 
Idaho 33,050 22,178 10,872 
Illinois 434,550 260,160 174,390 
Kansas 221,578 158,350 63,227 
Michigan 1,018,075 614,471 403,604 
Missouri 409,359 270,875 138,484 
North Carolina 1,642,853 959,633 683,220 
South Carolina 298,024 158,747 139,278 
    
Severe recession 6,515,740 3,733,710 2,782,030 
    
Arkansas 287,270 190,238 97,032 
Florida 1,168,316 586,435 581,882 
Georgia 786,411 450,856 335,555 
Idaho 28,651 20,041 8,610 
Illinois 558,306 337,306 221,000 
Kansas 135,714 101,517 34,197 
Michigan 1,211,996 693,531 518,465 
Missouri 427,080 293,963 133,117 
North Carolina 1,548,881 869,692 679,189 
South Carolina 363,115 190,130 172,984 
NOTE: Assuming 2018 are peak reserve levels. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b) and Georgia and Michigan micro administrative data. 
 
 
money to invest and spend in other ways during recessions, but these amounts will be eclipsed 
by the reduction in recession period consumer spending because of the larger reduction in UI 
benefit payments. There is also a larger income multiplier for changes in UI benefits than for 
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changes in business taxes.16 So, the depressing impact on economic activity is likely to be larger. 
Our simulations of benefit reductions provided first order estimates. Using the USDOL Benefit 
Financing Model simulations of the North Carolina cuts in benefit durations and amounts 
suggests that the UI benefit payments in a future recession will be about one-third what they 
would be absent the cuts (O’Leary and Van Erden 2012).  
Graphic summaries of our simulation results for all 53 UI programs are given in Figures 
5 and 6. Figure 5 summarizes the number of states that experience negative net reserves if a 
mild, moderate, or severe recession started in 2019. The simulations suggest that 11, 18, and 21 
states would have negative net reserves, respectively, if a recession starting in 2019 were mild,  
 
Figure 5  Numbers of States that Would Have Negative Reserves at the Simulated Recession Trough if a 
Mild, Average, or Severe Recession Followed the Peak Defined as the Observed 2018 Reserve Levels 
SOURCE: Results of authors’ computations using sources summarized in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
 
 
16 Chimerine, Black, and Coffey (1999) estimate the UI benefit multiplier on income to be about 2.5, 
largely because unemployed workers spend every penny of UI on goods and services. Business do not necessarily 
spend every dollar retained from tax reductions on new goods and services, so the tax reduction income multiplier is 
much smaller (Auerback 2018).  
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Figure 6  Net Reserve Ratio for 2018 for State UI Programs (except Virgin Islands), their 2007 Reserve Ratio and their Simulated Trough Values If an 
“Average” Recession Occurs from the 2018 Level 
NOTE: Virgin Islands with a reserve ratio of −17.61 for an average recession is excluded to improve the display for other states. 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b) and Georgia and Michigan micro administrative data.   
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moderate, or severe. At the end of 2010, the worst year for state UI reserves during the Great 
Recession, a total of 30 states had negative net reserve ratios. Our simulation suggests that 21 
states are at risk of exhausting UI reserves if another severe recession occurs.  
Figure 6 arrays states from lowest to highest net reserve ratio on taxable wages at year 
end for 2018, as represented by the dashed curve. The solid curve shows the pre–Great 
Recession reserve ratio peak for each state in 2007, and the dotted curve represents the simulated 
trough reserve ratio for each state should an average recession commence in 2019. Just 30 states 
are currently at or above their 2007 reserve ratio levels. Under mild or average recession 
scenarios, the overall UI system is sufficiently funded, but an average recession would require 18 
states to borrow to pay UI benefits with combined debt estimated at $15.3 billion. Reserve 
balances for each state, currently and under simulated recession scenarios, are listed in Table 6, 
with associated reserve ratios listed in Table 7.17 Rows for states in both of these tables are sorted 
from lowest to highest UI reserve ratio at year end 2018.  
STATE RESPONSES TO THE GREAT RECESSION 
How did state UI reserve positions get to where they are today? A standard measure of UI 
reserve adequacy is the high cost multiple (HCM). It is the number of years of recession level 
benefits in the state UI reserve account based on the highest 12-month benefit payout rate in 
history. The average high cost multiple (AHCM) is a HCM based on the average benefit 
experience in the three highest payout rate years in the past 20. For many states, the three biggest 
recent payout years are now 2009, 2010, and 2011. The USDOL has recommended that states  
 
17 Virgin Islands is excluded from Figure 6 because, as reported in Table 7, the simulated Virgin Islands 
reserve ratio for an average recession of −17.61 would compress display of reserve ratios for the other 52 state 
programs.  
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Table 6  Net Reserve Position of the States and Territories (adjusted for bond debt) for 2018 and Simulated 
Trough Values Should a Recession Occur from That 2018 Level 
 
State 
Net reserve 
ratio for 
2018 
Net reserves 
adjusted for 
bond debt 
Simulated trough reserves 
Mild 
recession 
Average 
recession 
Severe 
recession 
      Overall 3.79 64,575,761 25,551,982 7,965,482 −3,762,425 
      Virgin Islands −12.47 −68,329 −85,767 −96,487 −107,208 
Texas 1.35 1,542,291 −24,076 −931,809 −1,536,965 
California 1.70 2,231,396 −3,777,806 −4,196,086 −4,474,939 
Ohio 2.01 943,446 −214,234 −1,610,290 −2,540,994 
North Dakota 2.09 197,995 132,219 99,793 78,176 
Massachusetts 2.28 1,212,906 −1,343,921 −578,836 −68,780 
Indiana 2.36 653,186 −126,651 −624,095 −955,725 
West Virginia 2.42 169,934 143,463 −80,002 −228,979 
New York 2.57 2,373,468 −1,490,692 −1,330,832 −1,224,259 
Delaware 2.59 153,175 8,664 −115,242 −197,845 
South Dakota 2.62 127,711 91,924 72,800 60,050 
Minnesota 2.71 1,645,875 556,508 −111,435 −556,730 
Connecticut 2.72 568,773 −365,149 −407,602 −435,905 
New Jersey 2.75 2,599,598 −464,457 −594,603 −681,367 
Illinois 2.81 1,923,563 −358,707 −1,979,937 −3,060,756 
Colorado 2.82 964,545 423,754 −33,999 −339,168 
Kentucky 3.04 540,208 178,310 −184,487 −426,351 
Missouri 3.16 942,973 117,487 101,783 91,313 
New Mexico 3.21 454,730 478,256 294,633 172,218 
Pennsylvania 3.23 1,684,431 −522,055 −2,277,565 −3,447,905 
Montana 3.31 348,527 350,469 187,421 78,722 
Utah 3.44 1,129,574 925,366 587,859 362,854 
Hawaii 3.46 555,477 292,274 219,949 171,732 
South Carolina 3.62 919,712 372,588 −4,066 −255,169 
Kansas 3.66 825,504 666,387 514,507 413,254 
Iowa 3.86 1,188,972 1,088,560 548,294 188,116 
New Hampshire 4.07 311,354 158,323 116,786 89,094 
Arizona 4.07 871,051 507,727 181,328 −36,272 
Idaho 4.07 654,766 469,429 380,828 321,761 
Alabama 4.10 631,051 394,303 235,206 129,141 
Oklahoma 4.33 1,074,345 876,103 605,468 425,044 
Virginia 4.43 1,323,663 636,634 588,479 556,375 
Nevada 4.54 1,488,685 1,117,273 763,946 528,395 
North Carolina 4.69 3,592,731 2,897,358 2,067,077 1,513,557 
Washington 4.82 4,609,820 2,874,050 2,521,441 2,286,368 
Georgia 5.14 2,199,750 1,645,354 1,311,465 1,088,872 
Wisconsin 5.25 1,740,206 918,369 −183,659 −918,344 
Mississippi 5.28 685,887 592,460 480,441 405,762 
Tennessee 5.33 1,175,137 880,410 713,611 602,412 
Rhode Island 5.55 450,962 184,390 54,275 −32,468 
Nebraska 5.57 441,800 408,289 358,482 325,277 
Maryland 5.60 1,191,203 685,876 490,728 360,629 
Florida 5.89 3,872,081 3,644,756 2,897,204 2,398,836 
Alaska 6.01 471,314 398,277 434,981 459,451 
Arkansas 6.55 742,675 616,639 505,764 431,848 
Louisiana 6.57 982,344 969,666 421,312 55,743 
Wyoming 7.08 338,063 352,214 266,894 210,014 
Maine 7.63 465,423 355,512 318,609 294,007 
District of Columbia 8.81 475,988 411,772 328,477 272,947 
Michigan 9.03 3,388,990 1,854,814 639,966 −169,933 
Oregon 9.65 4,486,683 3,810,954 3,266,013 2,902,719 
Vermont 12.14 464,156 323,106 258,898 216,093 
Puerto Rico 12.52 615,992 515,209 471,798 442,858 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b) and Georgia and Michigan micro administrative data. 
 27 
Table 7  Reserve Position of the States and Territories (adjusted for bond debt) for 2018 and Simulated 
Reserve Ratio Trough Values Should a Recession Occur from That Level 
 
 
 
Taxable wages 
for 2018 
 
Reserve ratio 
for 2018 
Simulated trough values  
Mild 
recession 
Average 
recession 
Severe 
recession 
Overall 1,701,622,645 3.79 1.50 0.47 −0.22 
      Virgin Islands 547,934 −12.47 −15.65 −17.61 −19.57 
Texas 113,991,245 1.35 −0.02 −0.82 −1.35 
California 131,098,991 1.70 −2.88 −3.20 −3.41 
Ohio 46,987,742 2.01 −0.46 −3.43 −5.41 
North Dakota 9,459,147 2.09 1.40 1.05 0.83 
Massachusetts 53,166,868 2.28 −2.53 −1.09 −0.13 
Indiana 27,665,692 2.36 −0.46 −2.26 −3.45 
West Virginia 7,012,698 2.42 2.05 −1.14 −3.27 
New York 92,468,676 2.57 −1.61 −1.44 −1.32 
Delaware 5,917,937 2.59 0.15 −1.95 −3.34 
South Dakota 4,871,193 2.62 1.89 1.49 1.23 
Minnesota 60,763,846 2.71 0.92 −0.18 −0.92 
Connecticut 20,939,189 2.72 −1.74 −1.95 −2.08 
New Jersey 94,371,102 2.75 −0.49 −0.63 −0.72 
Illinois 68,406,823 2.81 −0.52 −2.89 −4.47 
Colorado 34,208,396 2.82 1.24 −0.10 −0.99 
Kentucky 17,777,369 3.04 1.00 −1.04 −2.40 
Missouri 29,854,246 3.16 0.39 0.34 0.31 
New Mexico 14,174,339 3.21 3.37 2.08 1.21 
Pennsylvania 52,176,590 3.23 −1.00 −4.37 −6.61 
Montana 10,542,965 3.31 3.32 1.78 0.75 
Utah 32,843,503 3.44 2.82 1.79 1.10 
Hawaii 16,046,353 3.46 1.82 1.37 1.07 
South Carolina 25,389,375 3.62 1.47 −0.02 −1.01 
Kansas 22,574,773 3.66 2.95 2.28 1.83 
Iowa 30,781,262 3.86 3.54 1.78 0.61 
New Hampshire 7,649,841 4.07 2.07 1.53 1.16 
Arizona 21,396,188 4.07 2.37 0.85 −0.17 
Idaho 16,068,015 4.07 2.92 2.37 2.00 
Alabama 15,408,153 4.10 2.56 1.53 0.84 
Oklahoma 24,790,312 4.33 3.53 2.44 1.71 
Virginia 29,850,771 4.43 2.13 1.97 1.86 
Nevada 32,798,437 4.54 3.41 2.33 1.61 
North Carolina 76,611,951 4.69 3.78 2.70 1.98 
Washington 95,724,903 4.82 3.00 2.63 2.39 
Georgia 42,761,848 5.14 3.85 3.07 2.55 
Wisconsin 33,144,616 5.25 2.77 −0.55 −2.77 
Mississippi 12,992,246 5.28 4.56 3.70 3.12 
Tennessee 22,067,371 5.33 3.99 3.23 2.73 
Rhode Island 8,127,262 5.55 2.27 0.67 −0.40 
Nebraska 7,934,583 5.57 5.15 4.52 4.10 
Maryland 21,269,908 5.60 3.22 2.31 1.70 
Florida 65,752,041 5.89 5.54 4.41 3.65 
Alaska 7,847,939 6.01 5.07 5.54 5.85 
Arkansas 11,342,908 6.55 5.44 4.46 3.81 
Louisiana 14,961,482 6.57 6.48 2.82 0.37 
Wyoming 4,777,926 7.08 7.37 5.59 4.40 
Maine 6,102,430 7.63 5.83 5.22 4.82 
District of Columbia 5,402,305 8.81 7.62 6.08 5.05 
Michigan 37,541,863 9.03 4.94 1.70 −0.45 
Oregon 46,517,819 9.65 8.19 7.02 6.24 
Vermont 3,822,377 12.14 8.45 6.77 5.65 
Puerto Rico 4,918,896 12.52 10.47 9.59 9.00 
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on USDOL (2019b) and Georgia and Michigan micro administrative data. 
 28 
have an AHCM of at least one. That is, at least one year of recession level benefits in reserve. 
Figure 7 is a graphic representation of 2018 ACHMs for state UI programs at the end of 2018. 
STATE RESPONSES TO THE GREAT RECESSION 
How did state UI reserve positions get to where they are today? A standard measure of UI 
reserve adequacy is the high cost multiple (HCM). It is the number of years of recession level 
benefits in the state UI reserve account based on the highest 12-month benefit payout rate in 
history. The average high cost multiple (AHCM) is a HCM based on the average benefit 
experience in the three highest payout rate years in the past 20. For many states, the three biggest 
recent payout years are now 2009, 2010, and 2011. The USDOL has recommended that states 
have an AHCM of at least one. That is, at least one year of recession level benefits in reserve. 
Figure 7 is a graphic representation of 2018 ACHMs for state UI programs at the end of 2018.  
 
Figure 7  State Unemployment Insurance Average High Cost Multiples, 2018 
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The pattern of state UI reserve sufficiency displayed in Figure 7 shows the geographic 
distribution of preparedness among states for paying UI benefits in the next recession. The 
pattern is influenced somewhat by the regional impacts of the Great Recession, but it is more a 
reflection of the UI policy actions taken by states since 2010. Table 8 provides a summary of six 
groupings of state UI financing policies since the Great Recession. The groupings of states are 
ordered from left to right by policy actions that least helped state UI reserves to those that most 
improved UI reserves. States are listed in the rows of the table from least prepared at the top to 
best prepared at the bottom in terms of their 2018 year-end AHCM values. The rows are grouped 
into four bands of reserve adequacy, with the top group including states having AHCM values 
less than 0.5, or less than six months of recession level benefits in reserve. The next band is 0.5 
<= AHCM < 1.0, then 1.0 <= AHCM < 1.5, and the bottom group being 1.5 <= AHCM.  
FUTA Credit Reduction 
The three columns on the left of Table 8 include the group of states that passively dealt 
with UI debt from the Great Recession through state inaction. All the states listed in this group 
go smaller than normal federal FUTA credit reductions. Employers in states with UI laws in 
conformity with federal requirements pay a FUTA tax rate that is reduced 90 percent from the 
statutory 6.0 percent rate. That means a FUTA tax rate of 0.6 percent on the first $7,000 of 
annual earnings paid to each employee. FUTA taxes normally pay for federal and state program 
administration, the federal share of the permanent extended benefits program, loans to states with 
insufficient reserves, and reemployment services. When states owe money to the U.S. Treasury 
from UI loans on January 1 in two consecutive years and fail to repay those debts in full by 
November 10 of the second year, then the FUTA tax reduction is cut by five percentage points  
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Table 8  States by 2018 Average High Cost Multiple and Policy Responses to UI Reserve Deficiency from 
the Great Recession 
FUTA credit 
reductions 
Override  
laws 
Issued  
bonds 
Reduced 
durations 
Financing 
reforms Let UI law work 
State AHCM State AHCM State AHCM State AHCM State AHCM State AHCM 
CA 0.15 MA 0.31 TX 0.31       
OH 0.33 OH 0.33         
NY 0.34   PA 0.33       
IN 0.38           
CT 0.42   IL 0.43 IL 0.43 WV 0.47    
KY 0.52           
NJ 0.65 NJ 0.65         
DE 0.67       DE 0.67   
    CO 0.70 
  CO 0.70   
MO 0.78   AZ 0.78 MO 0.78     
RI 0.79 MI 0.85 MI 0.85 MI 0.85 RI 0.79 MD 0.85 
WI 0.89         WI 0.89 
MN 0.94       TN 0.94 MN 0.94 
      SC 0.95 SC 0.95 AL 0.95 
          VA 1.03 
FL 1.08 FL 1.08   FL 1.08 NH 1.06 DC 1.13 
GA 1.13 GA 1.13   GA 1.13 ND 1.08 NM 1.16 
AR 1.20     AR 1.20 AR 1.20 HI 1.23 
    NV 1.23   WA 1.22 ME 1.25 
NC 1.29     NC 1.29 NC 1.29 LA 1.28 
      KS 1.31 KS 1.31 IA 1.43 
    ID 1.49 ID 1.49   MT 1.49 
          AK 1.65 
        OK 1.72 UT 1.73 
        SD 1.78 NE 1.75 
        MS 1.91 WY 2.24 
        VT 2.37 OR 2.34 
Mean 0.72  0.72  0.76  1.05  1.22  1.37 
Median 0.73  0.75  0.74  1.11  1.14  1.25 
NOTE: States are listed from lowest to highest value of the 2018 average high cost multiple (AHCM). The AHCM is the number 
of years of recession level benefits in the state UI reserve account at the U.S. Treasury based on the three highest UI benefit 
payment rates in the past 20 years. 
SOURCE: Groupings of states are based on Vroman (2018). The state ACHM values are from USDOL (2019b).  
 
 
that year with the penalty increasing by that same increment each year a debt remains 
outstanding. The FUTA tax cut falls from 90, to 85, 80, 75 percent and so forth in consecutive 
years if outstanding debt remains on January 1. The FUTA tax payments made for rates in excess 
of 0.6 percent are applied to pay down the debt for the state borrowing.  
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Since 2009 a total of 25 state UI programs had FUTA credit reductions resulting from 
borrowing (USDOL 2019c). Because FUTA credit reduction was the main means of retiring debt 
for them, 16 of these states are listed in the first column of Table 8. This list includes many of the 
states with the lowest 2018 AHCM values.  
Other states that also had FUTA credit reductions are listed among those issuing bonds to 
pay off debt: Pennsylvania, Illinois, Arizona, Michigan, and Nevada. Higher FUTA tax rates for 
these states quickly ended after proceeds from revenue bonds retired U.S. Treasury debt. South 
Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia each paid higher FUTA rates for only one year. The Virgin 
Islands territory is still paying a higher FUTA tax rate after annual increases since 2011. The 
majority of states listed in the first column of Table 8 also could have been listed in the right-
most column as having let their systems work, but the bulk of loan repayment for states listed in 
column one came not from letting their own state UI financing systems work, but from the 
FUTA tax increases. Allowing FUTA credit reductions to repay U.S. Treasury debt was a 
passive response to a funding crisis for many states with inadequate UI financing systems. The 
FUTA credit reductions have a cliff effect. After building over years to a high level they fall to 
zero with reserves slow to rebuild afterward. These states need serious examination of their 
financing systems.  
Override Laws 
Many state benefit financing systems have preset reserve thresholds that trigger shifts up 
in the UI tax schedule to increase rates on all employers when reserves decline below specified 
levels. These automatic adjustments are intended to rebuild reserves. Six states listed in Table 8 
overrode their state laws that would have increased employer UI tax rates because reserves had 
fallen. Presumably states took such actions to shield businesses from rate increases and 
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accommodate renewal early in the economic recovery, but several of these states failed to later 
take restorative action. These decisions delayed rebuilding reserves, and 4 of the 6 states still 
have deficient reserves below the recommended 1.0 AHCM that would permit zero-interest 
short-term borrowing from the UTF.  
Issued Bonds 
 Eight states issued revenue bonds to generate money to pay UI benefits or pay off U.S. 
Treasury debt during or after the Great Recession. In this period municipal bond rates were 
below 0.25 percent while U.S. Treasury rates were nearly 3.0 percent. The bonding maneuver 
saved states in this instance, but it can be a risky strategy when interest rates are volatile. 
Furthermore, for many states bonding involves shifting employer debt to a general obligation of 
the state. Bonding can be part of a strategy to keep employer tax rates low, but special taxes are 
normally assessed to retire bond debt, and these taxes are in addition to employer UI taxes. Six 
of the bonding states listed have 2018 AHCM below the 1.0 level recommended. This posture 
suggests the intention to bond-finance UI benefits in future recessions. Indeed Texas, the 
bonding state with the lowest 2018 AHCM, immediately bond-financed benefits when UI 
reserves were exhausted, and Texas employers never faced higher FUTA tax rates from the 
Great Recession. Gradually rebuilding reserves during an economic expansion remains a more 
prudent strategy with better countercyclical effects. 
Reduced Durations 
 Our reserve simulations account for the reductions in benefit durations introduced in 10 
states. We explained the weaker countercyclical strength of these systems and how the 
mechanisms for setting variable potential durations could be improved. Four of the 10 states 
have 2018 AHCM below the 1.0 target level. That is, despite paying out fewer benefits, the UI 
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reserves for most of these states still have not recovered to a level sufficient for another 
recession. Several aspects of UI system reform should be considered by these states. 
Active Finance Measures 
 In the wake of the Great Recession, 16 states listed in Table 8 undertook reforms to 
improve their UI benefit financing systems. Many increased their taxable wage bases, some reset 
reserve triggers for rate increases, and only 4 of these 16 states also cut benefit generosity. These 
16 states are neither clustered in one region nor do they share industrial makeup. Policy actions 
for most of these states reflect an appreciation for the UI system in contributing to the viability 
and strength of their state workforces.  
Let UI Law Work 
 The group of 17 states listed in the right columns of Table 8 simply let their UI financing 
systems work during and after the Great Recession. States in this group are clustered toward the 
bottom rows of the table reflecting higher 2018 AHCMs than most other states. What are the 
characteristics that make these state UI systems resilient? Nearly all of these states pay higher 
than average UI benefits, but all states in this group have financing systems that balance their 
benefit provisions. Balance between system financial inflows and outflows is essential.  
 Most state UI systems replace about 50 percent of prior weekly earnings up to a state 
maximum. The level of the state maximum weekly benefit determines the average wage 
replacement rate. Thirty-three states index their maximum weekly benefit amount by 
automatically resetting it annually as a proportion of average weekly wages in UI-covered 
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employment.18 Of these 33 states, 17 also index their state UI taxable wage bases to adjust 
annually.19 Among the 17 states that let their UI law work and did not revise things since the 
Great Recession, 10 states index both the benefit maximum and the taxable wage base, including 
9 of the 11 states in this group with the highest 2018 AHCM values. Most of these states pay 
higher than average benefits, have higher than average taxable wage bases, and have tax rates 
that are responsive over a wide range to changes in UI benefit charges.  
SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS 
Our simulation analysis suggests that current levels of UI reserves are not large enough in 
many states to avoid borrowing in the next recession. Indeed, the system as a whole will reach a 
net negative position if a severe recession should emerge in the coming months. While 
systemwide reserves are estimated to be sufficient for an average recession, 18 states would still 
rely on borrowing and would accumulate an estimated $15.3 billion in debt. There is a structural 
imbalance between taxes and benefits in the system that has worsened in recent years. By 
accepted standards of adequacy, benefit levels and durations throughout the system are not 
excessive, but financing is inadequate in many states.  
From a negative net reserve position in 2012, UI system net reserves recovered to $64.6 
billion by the end of 2018. However, a severe recession in the near future would generate a 
systemwide debt of $3.8 billion resulting from 21 states accumulating an estimated $21.7 billion 
 
18 In the second quarter of 2019, average weekly wage in UI-covered employment was $1,097 in the United 
States. Indexed maximum state UI weekly benefit amounts are commonly set between 50 and 67 percent of the state 
average weekly wage in UI-covered employment.  
19 Indexed state UI taxable wage bases are usually set between 50 and 100 percent of average annual 
earnings in UI-covered employment. In July 2019 average annual earnings were nearly $55,000 in UI-covered 
employment.  
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in new borrowing. During the Great Recession, systemwide indebtedness reached $30.7 billion 
in 2010. At the end of 2018 total UI system reserves stood at 3.8 percent of 2018 UI taxable 
wages. Our simulations suggest that systemwide reserves need to be at least 4.0 percent of 2018 
UI taxable wages to avoid a systemwide debt should a severe recession occur. A higher level of 
reserves would be prudent. The inadequacy of forward funding in many states has been 
accompanied by reductions in potential benefit durations in 10 states, and in one of these states 
the maximum weekly benefit amount was also cut more than 30 percent, thereby lowering the 
average UI wage replacement rate in the state.  
The federal-state UI system was originally designed to encourage forward funding of UI 
benefits to help improve the automatic countercyclical functioning of the UI benefit and tax 
system. To encourage forward funding, USDOL now provides an incentive of zero interest for 
short-term loans to states maintaining year-end reserves at the average high cost rate—that is, an 
average high cost multiple of one. If many states responded to this incentive, then individual 
state and overall system reserve adequacy would improve. Contrary to the concept of forward 
funding, some states have adopted a pay-as-you-go UI benefit financing approach that relies of 
external bond sales. This state strategy to reduce employer UI taxes works in the current low-
interest-rate environment, but it could present systemic risks and is likely to have procyclical 
effects particularly as interest rates rise. More generally, a major hindrance to adequate UI 
benefit system financing among states is the low $7,000 federal taxable wage base that sets the 
floor for state taxable wage bases. The low taxable wage base can also inhibit employer demand 
for low-wage workers. Indeed low-wage multiple job holders generate two or three times the UI 
tax contributions of high-wage single job holders. Increasing and indexing the federal taxable 
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wage base would improve UI benefit financing in many states and could improve low-wage 
labor demand.  
Ten states with negative UI reserve balances in 2010 reduced the potential duration of 
benefits in their states by 2012. Our simulations suggest that after an average recession these 10 
states will retain a combined $2.7 billion more in UI reserves than in the absence of benefit cuts, 
but 2 of these states will still experience a reserve deficit—that is, only one fewer state than if 
benefits had not been cut. The lost UI benefits to households in the 10 duration-cutting states in 
an average recession is estimated to be $6.3 billion, while aggregate tax reductions are estimated 
at $3.6 billion. Given marginal propensities to consume and invest, stimulus from business 
investment after tax cuts is unlikely to make up for lower consumer spending. For example, 
Vroman (2010, p. 63) writes that “the average tax multiplier is estimated to be −1.4 compared to 
2.0 for regular UI benefits, and 2.0 for extended benefits.”  
The scatter plot in Figure 8 summarizes state UI program positions in terms of the 
proportion of unemployed receiving benefits and the share of state GDP devoted to paying UI 
benefits. The benefit-cutting states denoted in red are mostly in the lower left corner of the 
scatterplot, meaning lower than average UI recipiency among the unemployed and lower shares 
of state GDP allocated to UI. While states in the upper right corner of the scatterplot in Figure 8 
invest modestly more to maintain accessible UI. However, some of these more generous states 
need to address financing deficiencies soon because they are late in preparing for the next 
recession.  
 Among the 10 states that shortened potential duration of UI benefits half tied the potential 
duration to the state unemployment rate. Variable potential duration might be inspired by the 
belief that when unemployment is low, jobs are more widely available, and successful job search 
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can be concluded more quickly. In practice the rules applied to translate state unemployment 
rates into state potential duration differ greatly. Florida sets potential duration at the start of each  
 
Figure 8  Regular UI Benefits as a Percent of Private Sector GDP and the UI Recipiency Rate for the 50 
States and the District of Columbia, 2017 
 
NOTE: States that cut benefit generosity since 2010 denoted in red.  
SOURCE: State GDP is from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Product Division (2019), 
total unemployed is from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019), and insured unemployed is from USDOL (2019b). 
 
year, for the whole year, based on unemployment in the third quarter of the previous year. In a 
rapidly deteriorating economy this rule can have the effect of providing no more than 14 weeks 
of benefits in a 52-week period. However, later in the year, if unemployment has risen sharply—
as happened in 2009—and job offers evaporate, then 14 weeks of benefits could be inadequate to 
support reemployment. The Kansas procedure wherein the potential duration is updated quarterly 
based on the most recently available data results in potential benefit durations being better 
aligned with labor market conditions.  
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Early studies of the economic development effects of interstate tax differences on 
business location decisions focus on markets straddling state borders (Carlton 1983; Wheaton 
1983). Neither study finds evidence that UI tax differences affected business location decisions, 
because cross-state differences in UI tax rates were not large and UI taxes were a small part of 
the total state tax bill for businesses. However, a later survey by Newman and Sullivan (1988) 
suggests that UI could have an effect because interstate differences were getting bigger in some 
markets straddling state borders. A recent study by Guo (2019) applying a research design 
focused on multisite manufacturing companies finds evidence that internal corporate decisions 
about which state to locate production and employment are influenced by state UI taxes. Guo 
finds that within multisite manufacturing companies, plant closures are more likely where UI 
taxes are higher. Her research design exploits interstate UI tax differences that have emerged and 
widened because some states have neglected UI financing while others have periodically raised 
or indexed UI tax bases. She concludes that “state-level administration of UI taxation introduces 
a wedge that contributed to the slow pace of hiring after the Great Recession, and to 
misallocation in the economy” (p. 29). Reducing or eliminating tax wedges between states could 
increase efficiency in allocation.  
The federal-state UI system was established during the Great Depression by the Social 
Security Act of 1935. The taxable wage base is the foundation for adequate forward funding of 
UI benefits. The federal taxable wage base, which was equal to the Social Security taxable wage 
base when Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) became law in 1939, is now less than 6 
percent of the Social Security tax base. The level of the state taxable wage base is an indicator of 
employer support for the state UI system. Boosting the FUTA tax base would raise the state tax 
base minimum and nudge many states to improve benefit financing, help restore the 
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reemployment emphasis of UI programs, and support better information technology and skilled 
staffing for state program administration. It would also improve forward funding of the system 
and reduce tax wedges between states, thereby improving the efficient allocation of resources 
among states.  
CONCLUSION  
The federal-state UI system exists to provide partial temporary income replacement to 
involuntarily unemployed workers as they seek reemployment. UI also plays an important 
macroeconomic role by automatically injecting spending during business downturns and 
withdrawing spending during expansions. Forward funding of benefits reinforces the UI 
countercyclical role, but differences in UI financing are emerging between states that can lead to 
misallocation of productive resources. Improved mechanisms and incentives for forward funding 
could improve economic outcomes and UI benefit adequacy. Immediate reforms should include 
increasing and indexing the federal unemployment taxable wage base, paying higher interest 
rates on state reserve deposits held at the U.S. Treasury, and charging lower interest rates for 
crisis loans to states—rates at or below prevailing municipal bond rates.20 Many states are likely 
to experience reserve deficiencies in the next recession. UI financing reforms should start 
immediately.  
  
 
20 For detailed proposals on UI financing matters, see O’Leary and Wandner (2018).  
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Table A1  Arkansas Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Balance 
change 
      
2007 244,347  269,144   
2008 250,374 −60,340 318,703 76,807 16,467 
2009 246,187 −59,331 596,216 143,688 84,357 
2010 333,418 −80,354 407,235 98,144 17,790 
      
  −200,025  318,639 118,614 
      
2000 175,800  168,301   
2001 156,435 −33,946 266,384 57,805 23,859 
2002 167,305 −36,305 292,729 63,522 27,217 
2003 221,369 −48,037 285,476 61,948 13,911 
      
  −118,289  183,276 64,987 
      
1990 122,214  130,216   
1991 124,311 −26,975 166,150 36,055 9,079 
1992 139,822 −30,341 172,543 37,442 7,100 
      
  −57,317  73,496 16,180 
      
1979 74,160  67,485   
1980 69,061 −16,644 113,321 27,310 10,667 
1981 92,995 −22,412 98,381 23,710 1,298 
1982 98,722 −23,792 137,122 33,046 9,254 
      
  −62,847  84,067 21,219 
      
1973 28,835  20,344   
1974 31,850 −7,676 33,146 7,988 312 
1975 31,804 −7,665 90,741 21,869 14,204 
1976 47,383 −11,419 55,439 13,361 1,941 
      
   −26,760  43,218 16,458 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 2.  
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Table A2  Florida Actual Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 880,107  1,067,319   
2008 774,767 −216,935 1,708,790 478,461 261,526 
2009 757,481 −212,095 2,916,853 816,719 604,624 
2010 1,121,142 −313,920 2,107,829 590,192 276,272 
      
  −742,949  1,885,372 1,142,423 
      
2000 398,303  634,750   
2001 525,447 −224,366 924,470 394,749 170,383 
2002 553,559 −236,370 1,177,430 502,763 266,393 
2003 671,942 −286,919 1,108,828 473,470 186,550 
      
  −747,655  1,370,981 623,326 
      
1990 251,364  460,325   
1991 305,302 −130,364 801,433 342,212 211,848 
1992 466,926 −199,377 824,306 351,979 152,601 
      
  −329,741  694,191 364,449 
      
1979 335,149  112,808   
1980 228,941 −64,103 153,073 42,860 −21,243 
      
  −64,103  42,860 −21,243 
      
1973 64,483  39,682   
1974 70,802 −19,825 109,013 30,524 10,699 
1975 93,112 −26,071 306,911 85,935 59,864 
1976 186,538 −52,231 218,883 61,287 9,057 
      
  −98,127  177,746 79,619 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 3. 
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Table A3  Georgia Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 524,366  559,031   
2008 489,989 −91,138 917,418 170,640 79,502 
2009 482,534 −89,751 1,657,492 308,294 218,542 
2010 627,975 −116,803 1,089,577 202,661 85,858 
2011 720,737 −134,057 873,186 162,413 28,356 
      
  −431,750  844,007 412,257 
      
2000 132,339  306,832   
2001 133,695 −35,028 592,872 155,332 120,304 
2002 127,540 −33,415 759,529 198,997 165,581 
2003 134,248 −35,173 729,739 191,192 156,019 
      
  −103,617  545,521 441,904 
      
1990 273,903  306,182   
1991 267,308 −70,035 453,248 118,751 48,716 
1992 298,874 −78,305 362,685 95,023 16,718 
      
  −148,340  213,774 65,435 
      
1979 193,336  122,395   
1980 173,414 −32,255 176,269 32,786 531 
1981 161,757 −30,087 176,712 32,868 2,782 
1982 147,552 −27,445 305,109 56,750 29,306 
1983 183,315 −34,097 226,923 42,208 8,111 
      
  −123,883  164,612 40,729 
      
1973 58,966  31,700   
1974 55,902 −10,398 75,966 14,130 3,732 
1975 49,518 −9,210 221,524 41,203 31,993 
1976 98,538 −18,328 135,882 25,274 6,946 
      
  −37,936  80,607 42,671 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 3. 
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Table A4  Idaho Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 
  
Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
revenue 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
benefits 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 129,587  117,370   
2008 96,565 −2,124 211,273 4,648 2,524 
2009 130,356 −2,868 383,004 8,426 5,558 
      
  −4,992  13,074 8,082 
      
2000 90,378  98,804   
2001 83,249 −3,413 140,700 5,769 2,355 
2002 93,172 −3,820 173,306 7,106 3,285 
2003 103,273 −4,234 176,309 7,229 2,994 
2004 111,424 −4,568 137,870 5,653 1,084 
      
  −16,036  25,756 9,720 
      
1990 67,174  55,326   
1991 46,906 −1,923 77,069 3,160 1,237 
1992 57,749 −2,368 78,227 3,207 840 
      
  −4,291  6,367 2,076 
      
1979 42,767  33,823   
1980 43,806 −964 54,101 1,190 226 
1981 44,526 −980 56,098 1,234 255 
1982 46,551 −1,024 91,929 2,022 998 
1983 65,362 −1,438 68,885 1,515 78 
      
  −4,405  5,962 1,557 
      
1973 15,561  12,404   
1974 18,330 −403 16,304 359 −45 
1975 19,177 −422 25,792 567 146 
      
  −825  926 101 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 3. 
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Table A5  Illinois Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 2,228,241  1,758,189   
2008 1,853,128 −85,244 2,209,468 101,636 16,392 
2009 1,437,434 −66,122 4,286,691 197,188 131,066 
2010 1,828,824 −84,126 2,895,592 133,197 49,071 
      
  −235,492  432,021 196,529 
      
2000 1,093,063  1,155,272   
2001 1,007,109 −36,256 1,841,964 66,311 30,055 
2002 1,047,931 −37,726 2,347,328 84,504 46,778 
2003 1,315,329 −47,352 2,340,076 84,243 36,891 
      
  −121,333  235,057 113,724 
      
1990 984,788  908,189   
1991 886,606 −31,918 1,272,517 45,811 13,893 
1992 919,619 −33,106 1,277,517 45,991 12,884 
      
  −65,024  91,801 26,777 
      
1979 796,538  665,180   
1980 828,719 −38,121 1,205,902 55,471 17,350 
1981 812,505 −37,375 1,199,868 55,194 17,819 
1982 946,020 −43,517 1,576,263 72,508 28,991 
1983 1,036,658 −47,686 1,361,443 62,626 14,940 
      
  −166,699  245,800 79,100 
      
1973 326,224  177,384   
1974 306,856 −14,115 246,321 11,331 −2,785 
1975 175,645 −8,080 673,612 30,986 22,906 
1976 294,719 −13,557 692,298 31,846 18,289 
1977 483,871 −22,258 647,996 29,808 7,550 
      
  −58,010  103,970 45,960 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 2. 
 
 
 
  
 46 
Table A6  Kansas Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 228,187  177,673   
2008 216,833 −15,612 259,545 18,687 3,075 
2009 200,867 −14,462 650,657 46,847 32,385 
2010 350,392 −25,228 424,999 30,600 5,372 
2011 388,535 −27,975 312,053 22,468 −5,507 
      
  −83,277  118,602 35,325 
      
2000 142,975  153,878   
2001 172,883 −25,241 215,264 31,429 6,188 
2002 182,443 −26,637 318,659 46,524 19,888 
2003 226,509 −33,070 316,897 46,267 13,197 
      
  −84,948  124,220 39,272 
      
1990 168,237  145,384   
1991 165,618 −24,180 177,277 25,882 1,702 
1992 171,439 −25,030 181,487 26,497 1,467 
1993 175,533 −25,628 168,641 24,622 −1,006 
1994 176,921 −25,830 143,579 20,963 −4,868 
1995 54,852 −8,008 137,277 20,042 12,034 
1996 34,348 −5,015 113,911 16,631 11,616 
1997 35,979 −5,253 101,705 14,849 9,596 
1998 39,427 −5,756 117,277 17,122 11,366 
1999 42,525 −6,209 139,221 20,326 14,118 
       
  −130,910  186,935 56,025 
      
1979 79,660  57,631   
1980 83,266 −5,995 113,832 8,196 2,201 
1981 88,241 −6,353 103,779 7,472 1,119 
1982 105,685 −7,609 207,251 14,922 7,313 
      
  −19,958  30,590 10,632 
      
1973 47,462  19,916   
1974 49,177 −3,541 32,508 2,341 −1,200 
1975 51,274 −3,692 58,074 4,181 490 
      
  −7,232  6,522 −711 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 3.  
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Table A7  Michigan Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) 
Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 1,541,194  1,772,196   
2008 1,495,409 −222,816 2,149,288 320,244 97,428 
2009 1,302,742 −194,109 3,635,514 541,692 347,583 
2010 1,418,577 −211,368 1,975,665 294,374 83,006 
      
  −628,292  1,156,310 528,017 
      
2000 1,016,490  888,583   
2001 962,178 −112,575 1,594,986 186,613 74,039 
2002 944,412 −110,496 1,820,861 213,041 102,545 
2003 1,093,178 −127,902 1,907,151 223,137 95,235 
2004 1,308,935 −153,145 1,790,965 209,543 56,398 
2005 1,436,075 −168,021 1,728,177 202,197 34,176 
2006 1,516,376 −177,416 1,877,441 219,661 42,245 
      
  −849,555  1,254,191 404,636 
      
1990 1,050,913  1,134,852   
1991 1,050,860 −122,951 1,488,274 174,128 51,177 
      
  −122,951  174,128 51,177 
      
1979 724,110  595,577   
1980 617,517 −92,010 1,141,476 170,080 78,070 
1981 624,164 −93,000 935,815 139,436 46,436 
1982 598,996 −89,250 1,524,401 227,136 137,885 
1983 833,591 −124,205 945,485 140,877  
      
  −398,466  677,529 279,063 
      
1973 338,702  183,064   
1974 296,241 −44,140 458,362 68,296 24,156 
1975 283,801 −42,286 835,930 124,554 82,267 
1976 470,122 −70,048 487,646 72,659 2,611 
      
  −156,474  265,509 109,034 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 2. 
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Table A8  Missouri Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 555,538  413,759   
2008 581,010 −83,084 569,002 81,367 −1,717 
2009 529,641 −75,739 1,097,990 157,013 81,274 
2010 551,395 −78,849 809,425 115,748 36,898 
2011 627,404 −89,719 615,861 88,068 −1,651 
      
  −327,391  442,196 114,804 
      
2000 237,621  313,857   
2001 236,257 −30,241 470,749 60,256 30,015 
2002 250,142 −32,018 564,205 72,218 40,200 
2003 319,273 −40,867 591,919 75,766 34,899 
2004 376,988 −48,254 497,995 63,743 15,489 
      
  −151,380  271,983 120,603 
      
1990 187,894  289,305   
1991 196,935 −25,208 396,898 50,803 25,595 
1992 253,684 −32,472 371,986 47,614 15,143 
1993 309,638 −39,634 314,639 40,274 640 
      
  −97,313  138,691 41,378 
      
1979 214,282  148,396   
1980 106,817 −15,275 278,426 39,815 24,540 
1981 141,392 −20,219 253,067 36,189 15,970 
1982 245,509 −35,108 301,768 43,153 8,045 
      
  −70,602  119,156 48,555 
      
1973 61,042  68,057   
1974 91,078 −13,024 96,444 13,791 767 
1975 89,523 −12,802 225,707 32,276 19,474 
1976 156,972 −22,447 150,222 21,482 −965 
      
  −48,273  67,549 19,276 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 2. 
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Table A9  North Carolina Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and the 
Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
       
2007 899,017  689,718   
2008 867,921 −171,848 1,022,205 202,397 30,548 
2009 735,634 −145,656 2,487,117 492,449 346,794 
2010 760,440 −150,567 1,716,853 339,937 189,370 
2011 860,771 −170,433 1,316,141 260,596 90,163 
      
  −638,504  1,295,379 656,875 
      
2000 300,504  477,408   
2001 315,885 −77,076 918,969 224,228 147,152 
2002 412,690 −100,696 1,066,002 260,104 159,408 
2003 745,955 −182,013 922,214 225,020 43,007 
      
  −359,785  709,353 349,568 
       
1990 212,849  297,935   
1991 219,058 −53,450 472,812 115,366 61,916 
1992 265,845 −64,866 362,149 88,364 23,498 
1993 281,002 −68,564 244,942 59,766 −8,799 
1994 219,125 −53,466 261,869 63,896 10,430 
1995 196,848 −48,031 315,503 76,983 28,952 
1996 96,091 −23,446 381,767 93,151 69,705 
1997 229,976 −56,114 346,357 84,511 28,397 
1998 299,852 −73,164 378,427 92,336 19,172 
1999 327,033 −79,796 415,731 101,438 21,642 
      
  −520,899  775,812 254,913 
      
1979 239,095  111,759   
1980 223,017 −44,157 230,529 45,645 1,487 
1981 205,880 −40,764 248,402 49,184 8,419 
1982 196,252 −38,858 448,630 88,829 49,971 
1983 227,470 −45,039 295,316 58,473 13,434 
      
  −168,819  242,130 73,311 
      
1973 63,780  28,723   
1974 81,809 −16,198 61,205 12,119 −4,080 
1975 75,295 −14,908 300,648 59,528 44,620 
1976 99,129 −19,628 173,802 34,413 14,785 
      
  −50,734  106,060 55,326 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 3. 
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Table A10  South Carolina Regular UI Tax Contributions and Benefit Costs in Peak-to-Trough Years and 
the Simulated Changes to Reserve Balance (values in $000s) 
 Tax revenue loss (−) Benefit cost savings (+) Net reserve 
balance 
change 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
Actual 
level 
Simulated 
reduction 
      
2007 274,887  339,400   
2008 264,061 −31,687 474,040 56,885 25,197 
2009 235,642 −28,277 910,924 109,311 81,034 
2010 256,190 −30,743 547,335 65,680 34,937 
      
  −90,707  231,876 141,169 
      
2000 170,704  196,634   
2001 167,135 −17,883 374,324 40,053 22,169 
2002 179,995 −19,259 410,218 43,893 24,634 
2003 222,429 −23,800 401,843 42,997 19,197 
      
  −60,943  126,943 66,000 
      
1990 167,085  132,339   
1991 158,661 −16,977 234,323 25,073 8,096 
1992 157,962 −16,902 212,344 22,721 5,819 
      
  −33,879  47,793 13,915 
      
1979 113,139  65,571   
1980 115,419 −13,850 124,314 14,918 1,067 
1981 109,900 −13,188 133,197 15,984 2,796 
1982 106,991 −12,839 238,869 28,664 15,825 
1983 123,708 −14,845 150,363 18,044 3,199 
      
  −54,722  77,609 22,887 
      
1973 40,529  18,027   
1974 36,402 −4,368 39,022 4,683 314 
1975 31,058 −3,727 157,022 18,843 15,116 
1976 72,349 −8,682 81,309 9,757 1,075 
      
  −16,777  33,282 16,505 
SOURCE: USDOL (2019b) and authors’ computations using estimates in Table 2. 
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Figure A1  Florida’s Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate and the Third Quarter Average from the 
Prior Year that is Used to Determine Maximum Regular UI Entitlement 
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Figure A2  Florida’s Maximum Potential Regular UI Duration Using Current Law and the Monthly 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate and the Maximum Resulting from the Law as Written 
which uses the Prior Year’s Third Quarter Average 
 
SOURCE: Florida statute 443.111 and USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate seasonally adjusted for Florida 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
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Figure A3  Georgia’s Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate and the April and October Rates Used to 
Determine Maximum Regular UI Duration for July–December (April) and the following January–
June (October) 
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Figure A4  Georgia’s Maximum Regular UI Duration Using the State Unemployment Rate and the Maximum 
Resulting from the April and October Rates Used to Determine Maximum Entitlement for July–
December (April) and January–June (October) 
 
SOURCE: HB 347, www.legis.ga.gov and USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate seasonally adjusted for Georgia 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
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Figure A5  Idaho’s State Unemployment Rate and the Rates Used to Determine Maximum Regular UI 
Duration for January–March (Prior November), April–June (February), July–September (May) 
and October–December (August) 
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Figure A6  Idaho’s Maximum Regular UI Duration Using the State Unemployment Rate and the Maximum 
Resulting from the Rates Used to Determine Maximum Entitlement for Jan–Mar (Prior 
November), Apr–Jun (February), Jul–Sep (May) and Oct–Dec (August) 
 
SOURCE:  HB 485, 2016 second regular session,  https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2016/legislation/ and USDOL, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate 
seasonally adjusted for Idaho 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
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Figure A7  Kansas’s State Unemployment Rate and the Three-Month Moving Average Rate with a Two-
Month Reporting Lag that is Used to Determine Maximum Regular UI Duration 
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Figure A8  Kansas’s Maximum Potential Regular UI Duration Using the State Unemployment Rate and the 
Maximum Resulting from the Three-Month Moving Average Rate Actually Used 
 
SOURCE: Kansas statute 44-704 (2017) and USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate seasonally adjusted for Kansas 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
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Figure A9  North Carolina’s State Unemployment Rate and the April and October Rates Used to Determine 
Maximum Regular UI Duration for July–December (April) and January–June (October) 
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Figure A10  North Carolina’s Maximum Regular UI Duration based on the State Unemployment Rate and 
the Maximum from the April and October Rates Used for July–December (April) and January–
June (October) 
SOURCE: North Carolina statute 96-14.2 and USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics:  
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la monthly unemployment rate seasonally adjusted for Kansas 1/31/1976 to 3/31/2019. 
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